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Based on the notion that good health is one of the basic right of all citizens, the Government of Indonesia 
(GoI) has promoted programs on health care financing for the poor. One of these programs is the Jaminan 
Pemeliharaan Kesehatan (JPK). In 2003, the pilot project on JPK for the poor (JPK-Gakin) started in 15 
districts and two provinces, and was expanded to additional regions the following year. Since April 1 
2004, PT Askes, a profit oriented private insurance company, was assigned as the insurer of the non-
profit health insurance scheme for the poor (the JPK-Gakin) in district Tabanan. With respect to PT 
Askes it is important to see in what ways does the prominent role of PT Askes influence the dynamics of 
health service delivery and how different is PT Askes from other insurers (the non-profit - public 
institutions) in managing the JPK-Gakin scheme.  
The Tabanan case demonstrated that the supervision and monitoring by the Dinas Kesehatan (DinKes) of an 
insurer like Askes runs the risks of being less effective because PT Askes is a relatively well-established 
institution that is totally independent of the DinKes. Moreover, there is a difference in the level of expertise and 
experience between PT Askes and the Dinkes regarding the management of insurance schemes. Therefore, the 
supervision and monitoring of PT Askes by the DinKes tends to be “formal” instead of “actual.” This 
difference in the level of expertise and experience can also be a barrier for the DinKes to negotiate the cost and 
coverage of the scheme with PT Askes. PT Askes – as the insurer – is also barely involved in the promotion 
and socialization of the program and the identification of the poor as their potential clients.   
Obviously, the JPK-Gakin scheme can secure primary health care for the poor (the gakin) at the 
puskesmas, but this does not necessarily mean that the poor will receive good quality care. In general, the 
health care at the puskesmas is quite limited both in term of quality and variety. The implementation of the 
JPK-Gakin scheme –including adequate capitation for the puskesmas from this scheme– would certainly 
not change this condition easily as it relates to more complex factors such as the availability of good 
medical staffs, instruments and facilities. The most positive effect of the JPK-Gakin scheme on the 
provision of health care for the poor is the possibility to get secondary and tertiary health care that is 
usually unaffordable for the poor. Nevertheless, for a range of different reasons, the majority of Gakin 
patients are not referred to the hospital. There are cases where the poor refused to be referred to the 
hospital although it was necessary because they were insecure about the additional costs that were not 
covered by PT Askes. Thus, although the JPK-Gakin scheme does secure the right of the poor to get 
medical treatment at the hospital, it cannot secure the actualization of it. 




Based on the notion that good health is one of the basic rights of all citizens, the 
Government of Indonesia (GoI) has promoted programs on health care financing for the 
poor. In 1998, the GoI introduced JPS-BK
1 program to provide healthcare for the poor 
through community healthcare centers (puskemas) and village midwives (bidan desa). In 
2001, the GoI introduced the PDPSE-BK
2 program. This program, inter alia, consisted of the 
provision of medicines and Hepatitis-B vaccine for the primary health care. In 2002, the 
program was renamed into PKPS-BBM
3 Health Sector. 
 
Nevertheless, a more effective, efficient and sustainable financing mechanism is needed as 
the costs of health provision for the poor increase and become a greater burden on the budget 
of the local government (APBD). For this reason, the GoI has developed a health-financing 
scheme, namely the Jaminan Pemeliharaan Kesehatan (JPK). In 2003, the pilot project on JPK 
for the poor (JPK untuk keluarga miskin/JPK-Gakin) started in 15 districts and two provinces 
in Indonesia, and was expanded to additional regions the following year. 
 
In general referred to as JPK-Gakin, the individual schemes do contain many significant 
differences in the characteristics of the scheme provided and who has initiated or been 
assigned as the health insurance provider. Three of the main differences include the 
insurer, the benefit package and the reimbursement system. In most cases, the 
Management Unit, Badan Pengelola (Bapel), consisting of members of the district Health 
Department and hospital doctors is the health insurance provider, whereas in two cases 
(Musi Banyuasin, Sumatra and Tabanan, Bali), PT Askes is the insurer. PT Askes is an 
organization that has a long history and experience of insurance provision and is a for-
profit organization. The districts are not tied to the provision of certain benefit packages 
and thus differences in benefit packages have also arisen. Some districts cover all 
available healthcare services that extend to providers outside the region, other districts 
have a more limited benefit package. 
 
Various evaluation studies (e.g. by ILO in 2003) have concluded that the JPK-Gakin 
scheme has not been successful in facilitating an accessible, affordable and sustainable 
health service for the poor. Problems such as low benefits, lack of institutional framework 
and poor management were mentioned as the reasons for the failure. In this case study 
however, we aim to look at the effects of these different characteristics of the health 
financing mechanism on healthcare service provision, quality of health care provision and 
how insurance characteristics can influence the relationships between stakeholders. Some 
districts have managed to implement and continue the scheme relatively well. This study 




                                                 
1 JPS-BK: Jaringan Pengaman Sosial Bidang Kesehatan (Social Safety Net - Health Sector). 
2 PDPSE-BK: Penanggulangan Dampak Pengurangan Subsidi Energi – Bidang Kesehatan (Reduced Energy Subsidies 
Impact Reduction – Health Sector). 
3 PKPS BBM: Program Kompensasi Pengurangan Subsidi Bahan Bakar Minyak (Compensation Program for 
Reduced Subsidies on Refined Fuel Oil). SMERU Research Institute, September 2005  2
•  Why have some districts been more successful in implementing the JPK-Gakin 
program than other districts? 
•  What are the barriers to better service delivery for the poor? 
•  What factors influence significant improvements of these services? 
 
Three districts were selected for the case studies; Purbalingga (Central Java), Tabanan (Bali) 
and East Sumba (Nusa Tenggara Timur).
4 Each of these districts was selected for a specific 
reason. Purbalingga was the first district to provide health insurance for the poor; a scheme 
that was its own initiative. As it now has a number of years of experience, an assessment on 
the sustainability of the scheme can also be undertaken. In addition, Purbalingga provides a 
benefit package for different premiums depending on people’s income; thereby increasing the 
outreach of the program. 
 
The second visit was to the district of Tabanan,
5 where a scheme is provided through PT Askes, a 
profit-oriented private company. The intention of the Department of Health (DepKes) “to 
provide JPK-Gakin in all districts by PT Askes in 2005” is another reason to include a scheme 
run by PT Askes. Until the end of 2004 there were only two districts where JPK-Gakin was 
provided by PT Askes; Musi Banyuasin (Sumatra) and Tabanan (Bali).
6 With respect to PT 
Askes it is important to see how an external body can interact with health provision and health 
management stakeholders and how their experience with providing insurance contributes to the 
provision of health insurance to the poor. Tabanan is a “second-generation JPK-Gakin” that was 
introduced in 2004. Including Tabanan in this case study provides an opportunity to examine its 
initial experiences with the provision of health insurance to the poor. 
 
The third case study area, East Sumba, is one district that has a very high poverty rate and 
thus the provision of health insurance can have a major influence in increasing access to 
health care for the poor. East Sumba is also a district that experiences many problems with 
distance as the population is spread over a wide area. Based on the three case studies an 
executive summary will be constructed that gives more information about the effects of the 
different characteristics of the health insurance programs. 
 
In Tabanan, PT Askes was assigned as the insurer or the Badan Pengelola (Bapel) of the non-
profit health insurance scheme for the poor. The majority of the 25 districts, which were 
assigned as pilot project areas (daerah uji coba) of JPK-Gakin, have implemented different 
management systems by using a Badan Pengelola/Bapel JPKM.
7 This is a management unit 
consisting of at least four fulltime staff, including a unit head (the main coordinator) and 
three other staff who will manage the membership, finance and health service. In what ways 
does the prominent role of PT Askes influence the dynamics of health service delivery? How 
different is PT Askes from Bapel in managing the JPK-Gakin scheme and why? This report 
attempts to answer these questions. 
                                                 
4 For the pilot case study, we went to Cilegon, West Java. 
5 Tabanan district is an area of 839.33 km
2. This district (kabupaten) has 10 sub-districts (kecamatan) and 116 
villages. In 2004, the district was inhabited by 394,004 people (94,544 households) with a density rate of 532 
persons/km
2. The average number of household members is four people. 
6 Our initial plan was to visit Musi Banyuasin as this district was the first to initiate a PT Askes run JPK-Gakin, 
however, due to circumstances we have not been able to visit this location. Therefore, we have replaced Musi 
Banyuasin with Tabanan a second-generation JPK-Gakin. 
7 JPKM: Jaminan Pemeliharaan Kesehatan Masyarakat (Community Health Insurance Scheme). SMERU Research Institute, September 2005  3
II. THE HEALTH INSURANCE SCHEME 
 
 
A. THE COMMENCEMENT 
 
Unlike most other pilot areas, the health insurance scheme for the poor (JPK-Gakin) in 
Tabanan district is managed by PT Askes. Consequently, the scheme is also commonly 
known as Askes–Gakin. The scheme started in April 1
st 2004 when the Tabanan district was 
awarded the status of “Area of Development” (Daerah Pengembangan).
8 
 
According to the Dinas Kesehatan
9 (DinKes) Tabanan district, they purposely assigned PT 
Askes as the insurer of JPK-Gakin for two reasons: 
1.  DinKes Tabanan wanted to avoid the risk of failure that can cause serious financial 
problems. They learned from the mismanagement of Dana Sehat (the previous health 
financing mechanism for the poor) by inexperienced institutions in other regions. 
2.  PT Askes is seen as a professional institution that has the required length of 
experience in managing insurance schemes and has a wide coverage area. It therefore 
has the ability to service the whole Bali province, thus allowing for a possible 
expansion of the scheme and thus increasing the risk pool. Another organization 
other than PT Askes with the ability to cover the whole region is not available. 
 
Each stakeholder involved in the JPK-Gakin scheme claimed to be the initiator of the 
scheme. The DinKes suggested that they took the first step, by contacting and proposing PT 
Askes to manage the JPK-Gakin in Tabanan. On the other hand, PT Askes and even the 
public hospital (Badan Rumah Sakit Umum/BRSU) of Tabanan also suggested that they were 
the initiators of a health financing mechanism for the poor in Tabanan. 
 
Referring to the fact that Bali does not have large industries with many employees (who 
would be potential members of Askes) and that most hotel employees are already insured by 
the Jamsostek, I Wayan Sumarta from PT Askes Tabanan said that PT Askes has 
implemented a more assertive policy of recruitment in Bali. PT Askes needs to look for 
potential members in various groups or institutions. According to the Denpasar branch of PT 
Askes, one of these recruitment efforts involves sending proposals on the health insurance 
scheme to many institutions as well as every district in Bali. Nevertheless, only Tabanan and 
Buleleng districts were interested in the proposal. 
 
The management of the public hospital (BRSU Tabanan) also saw themselves as the initiator 
of the health financing mechanism. According to them, they were concerned about the 
provision of an affordable health care system for the poor and, therefore, made a proposal to 
the DinKes on this issue.  
 
                                                 
8 Singaraja and Klungkung Districts received the status of pilot district (‘Daerah uji coba’) in 2003, earlier 
than the Tabanan district, but in those regions health insurance was started only in August 2004. In 
Klungkung the Dinas Kesehatan decided against having PT Askes as the insurer and instead chose a 
‘Koperasi Kesehatan’ to be the insurer. 
9 Dinas Kesehatan (DinKes) is the regional government health administration at the provincial or district 
(kabupaten/kota) level. SMERU Research Institute, September 2005  4
It will remain unclear who really took the first step to initiate the financing mechanism for 
the poor in Tabanan since all of the main stakeholders claim to be the initiator and they 
were (and still are) interconnected in their actions. It is likely that all of them did react to a 
central government program from their own position and perspective, and all have 
influenced the start of the JPK-Gakin (or the Askes-Gakin) in Tabanan. 
 
As was mentioned earlier, the Musi Banyuasin district (Palembang) also has assigned PT 
Askes as the insurer of JPK-Gakin. As Tabanan is included in the second wave of districts 
that implemented JPK-Gakin, it expected to be informed by the central administrations of 
the Department of Health and/or PT Askes. On the question of whether they were able to 
learn from the experiences in the first district, Musi Banyuasin (Muba), the Dinas 
Kesehatan claimed that they only knew about Musi Banyuasin from the meeting in Cisarua, 
Puncak in December 2004. The Ministry of Health did not inform DinKes Tabanan about 




B. THE INSURER AND THE FINANCING MECHANISM 
 
The PT (Persero) Asuransi Kesehatan Indonesia/PT Askes (Denpasar branch) covers four 
districts: Tabanan, Buleleng, Badung and Jembrana. The Denpasar office is assisted by an 
office in Tabanan that is located at the public hospital (BRSU “Rumah Kita”). In Tabanan, 
apart from civil servants and retirees (about 33,000 insured), PT Askes also manages other 
health insurance schemes that are funded by the provincial government (Pemerintah Daerah 
Tingkat I) namely:  
 
1.  Health insurance for village officials started in 1997 (1,500 – 2,000 insured, premium: 
Rp.5,000/person/month, covers health care services provided according to the 3
rd class 
in-patient standard at the BRSU). 
 
2.  Health insurance for the Sulinggih and Bende seadat (religious leaders) started in 2000 (500 
insured, premium: Rp.25,000/person/month, covers health care services provided 
according to 1
st class in-patient standard at the RSUD). 
 
3.  Health insurance for the Pemangku Satu Kayangan (other category of religious leaders), 
that started in 2002 and has a similar premium and coverage as the health insurance 
scheme for Sulinggih and Bende seadat. 
 
In general, the membership of Askes can be categorized into: 
1.  Askes Social (Kepesertaan Sosial): civil servants and retirees; 
2.  Askes Commercial (Kepesertaan Sukarela): private companies, BUMN with a premium 
of Rp.15,000/month; 
3.  Askes-Gakin (starting Jan 1
st, 2005, based on the Minister of Health’s (Republic of 
Indonesia) Decree number 1241/MENKES/SK/XI/2004,
11 premium Rp.5,000/ 
person/month). 
                                                 
10 In December 2004 a meeting between all the main stakeholders of JPK-Gakin of all 25 districts and four 
provinces currently providing JPK-Gakin was held in Cisarua (West-Java). 
11 Concerning the responsibilities of PT (Persero) Askes in the management of the healthcare program for 
poor communities. SMERU Research Institute, September 2005  5
Cooperation between DinKes Tabanan and ASKES Bali is formally regulated based on a one-
year contract with PT Askes, which can be extended annually.
12 This contract covers the 
period April 1
st, 2004 - March 31
st, 2005 and regulates various aspects of JPK-Gakin 
Management, for instance the reimbursement system, the premium, rights and responsibilities 
of stakeholders, the provision of health services, the benefit package, arbitration of conflict, 
force majeure, etc. The contract does not, however, regulate how unspent health funds would 
be used. When, in 2004, there was indeed money left from the health funds, PT Askes 
considered it to be available for their disposal. Nevertheless, the DinKes Tabanan demanded 
and negotiated an outcome that resulted in PT Askes retaining 20% of the unspent funds 
with a part of the remaining funds (in the form of durable assets such as computers, cars etc.) 
being returned to DinKes. For 2005, the contract will be revised and unspent funds will be 
rolled over into the funds for the new term. 
 
According to the evaluation on the implementation of JPK-Gakin scheme in 2004 carried 
out by the DinKes Tabanan, the unspent funds totalled Rp.33,026,000. This amount is based 
on a financial report made by PT Askes for the period of January – November 2004. 
Interestingly, the reported period is not consistent with the term of the JPK-Gakin contract. 
The contract was issued, and the formal cooperation period was started, three months later 
than the date of commencement of actual cooperation. The three months gap between the 
date of commencement of actual and formal cooperation between the main stakeholders of 
the JPK-Gakin scheme in Tabanan could be the result of different causes; from simple 
administration delay, strategic calculation, a tough negotiation process up to a flexible 
relationship between main stakeholders which is based on trust. On the basis of the 
investigation undertaken for this report, it appears that the DinKes Tabanan and PT Askes 
have had a cooperative relationship since the inception of the agreement. This is different to 
other districts (for example in Purbalingga and East Sumba) where PT Askes involvement in 
JPK-Gakin management is accepted only reluctantly by the district government. 
 
DinKes Tabanan was also questioned about their decision to cooperate with a private and 
profit oriented company like PT Askes in managing a non-profit health financing mechanism 
for the poor and, specifically, whether DinKes negotiates with PT Askes about the limitations 
they set on the benefit package as a result of commercial calculations. DinKes admitted that 
they are gradually becoming aware of, and learning to deal with, the commercial side of PT 
Askes as the JPK-Gakin insurer. PT Askes, for instance, does not reimburse a number of more 
costly treatments, medication and referrals to Sanglah Hospital. As the contract with PT 
Askes is an annual contract, DinKes intends to revise the next contract. DinKes plans to 
demand that several treatments such as CT Scans be put in the benefit package and that the 
insured have a right of referral to Sanglah Hospital which has more facilities. Furthermore, 
DinKes also proposes that if there are unspent JPK-Gakin funds at the end of the contract 
period, DinKes will be partially reimbursed by PT Askes in the form of assets (computers, cars 
etc.). Nevertheless, Dr. Arisuta from the DinKes admitted that DinKes’ actual bargaining 
position is not powerful enough to achieve these outcomes since the APBD funds (the 
portion of JPK-Gakin funds that should be subsidized by the district government) have not 
                                                 
12 Perjanjian Kerjasama Antara Pemerintah Kabupaten Tabanan dengan PT (Persero) Asuransi Kesehatan Indonesia 
Cabang Denpasar tentang Penyelenggaraan Jaminan Pemeliharaan Kesehatan: The Cooperative Agreement between 
the Government of Kabupaten Tabanan and PT (Persero) Asuransi Kesehatan Indonesia, Denpasar Branch, 
concerning the Implementation of Health Care Support. SMERU Research Institute, September 2005  6
been given to PT Askes. Until now PT Askes only operates with funds provided by the 
central government. 
 
C. THE INSURED 
 
Poor families (the keluarga miskin or gakin) are automatically enrolled into Askes-Gakin. In 
2004, there were 10,710 gakin households or 37,791 persons in Tabanan district. This is about 
9% of the district population.
13 According to the DinKes, the criteria for the gakin in Tabanan 
are not clear, consequently there are poor people who were not identified and therefore were 
not entitled to the free health services. Nevertheless, some of them were able to assert their 
rights by approaching the village head, who appears to be the key to identifying the gakin, or 
went straight to DinKes to complain if they were not enrolled in the Askes-Gakin scheme. 
The enrolment takes place once a year and the new term commences each April. 
 
D. THE HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS 
 
The providers of primary health care (Penyedia Pelayanan Kesehatan/PPK I) are in the 19 
puskesmas in Tabanan, including their secondary health centers or puskesmas pembantu 
(pustu) and village maternity polyclinics or poliklinik bersalin desa (polindes). None of these 
puskesmas have in-patient facilities. People are not obliged to attend the puskesmas closest to 
their house to receive free health services. Patients are thus able to choose what pukesmas 
they want to attend and that will be recorded on their card. In practice, some people did go 
to different puskesmas than what is written on their card. This is usually tolerated for only a 
few times as it puts an administrative burden on the puskesmas because they get capitation 
only for the number of gakin in their working area. 
 
Different maternity care services from different health care providers are included in the 
benefit package. Patients can go to the hospital to see a doctor or a nurse, but they can also 
receive services from the village midwife at the puskesmas, pustu, or polindes. Almost every 
village midwife runs a small private clinic outside her working hours at the puskesmas, pustu 
or polindes although the cost of childbirth in this private clinic ranges between Rp500,000 
and Rp.700,000 (this is quite similar to the cost of childbirth in a public hospital). The 
reimbursement that the midwife receives from Askes for delivery is a maximum of 
Rp.100,000 and, as a consequence, the midwife provides a service under the asking price. As 
the income from gakin patients is so little, there is no incentive for the midwife to provide 
their services to the poor and so they are referred to the hospital. This policy was made to 
ensure that the poor will go to the hospital to give birth. This can prevent a higher cost in 
the situation where the patient has to be sent to the hospital anyway because there are 
complications during the childbirth which cannot be handled by the midwife. If the insured 
uses the services of Tabanan public hospital (BRSU), all costs will be covered by PT Askes. 
The utilization rate of maternity care services in the hospital has not altered since the 
implementation of the health insurance scheme. It may well be that patients are being 
referred to the hospital, but are actually not going there for other reasons. It could be that a 
change in doctors at a late stage of pregnancy is not a preferred option or, alternatively, that 
the distance from the patient’s home to the hospital is too great. 
 
                                                 
13 The number of gakin in Indonesia is about 38 million people. SMERU Research Institute, September 2005  7
The provider of secondary health care (PPK II) is the public hospital (BRSU ‘Rumah Kita’, 
Tabanan). As there is no private hospital, this is the only hospital in the district. The 
hospital manages its own resources and is independent of other financing.
14 It only receives 
funding from the local government for the salaries of civil servant staff (who constitute 
approximately 50% of total staff numbers). 
 
In theory, gakin patients can only be treated at the hospital after obtaining a referral letter 
from a puskesmas. Exceptions to this rule are, however, made for chronic cases and emergency 
treatment. Nevertheless, gakin patients regularly attend the hospital without having the 
required referral letter. In the case of emergency care, the patient’s family are usually asked to 
obtain a referral letter from the puskesmas within three days. We have identified several 
chronic illnesses for which a referral letter is, officially, not necessary, but a referral letter was 
still demanded by the hospital. 
 
Tertiary care can be received at the provincial hospital in Denpasar (the Rumah Sakit 
Sanglah) when necessary specialized care cannot be provided in the hospital in Tabanan. 
There have been only a few cases where a referral to Sanglah hospital has been made. In 
these cases, the costs were not always fully reimbursed by PT Askes and so the patient was 
required to make a co-payment to cover the cost of their treatment. 
 
E. THE PREMIUM 
 
The premium of the Askes-Gakin scheme is Rp.5,000/person/month. Of this amount, 
Rp.1,000 is allocated for the PPK I (the puskesmas) and Rp.4,000 is allocated for the PPK II 
and III (the hospitals). The premium was calculated by the DinKes, PT Askes and the 
hospital. According to the DinKes, they tried to negotiate with PT Askes to get a lower 
premium but they (PT Askes) did not agree. 
 
According to PT Askes Denpasar, the premium has been calculated based on: 
1.  hospital tariffs; and 
2.  PT Askes’ experience in managing the health insurance scheme for village officials 
(since 1997). The Askes–Gakin scheme is, indeed, very similar to this scheme in 
many aspects, including the premium and benefit package. 
 
F. THE REIMBURSEMENT SYSTEM 
 
The reimbursement system for primary care is a monthly capitation based on the number of 
poor people who are served by primary care centers (puskesmas). For the Askes–Gakin 
scheme, the puskesmas in Tabanan had already received four months capitation. The hospital 
is reimbursed on a fee-for-service system. This is similar to the reimbursement system of other 
types of health insurance scheme managed by PT Askes. Because there is an Askes office in 
the hospital, the reimbursement procedure – both for Askes-Gakin as well as for other Askes 
members - is relatively efficient and quick, with reimbursement usually in about two weeks. 
On average, the amount claimed by the hospital is about Rp90 million/month. It is planned 
that the reimbursement system for the hospital will be changed into a capitation system. 
 
                                                 
14 This is different in the sense that, in general, public facilities are highly subsidized. SMERU Research Institute, September 2005  8
Although it does not happen often, there are instances where PT Askes refused the claims 
from the hospital in cases with: 
1.  administrative errors; 
2.  mistakes in the benefit package provided, especially if the treatment standard is 
higher (and thus more costly); and 
3.  incomplete formalities. 
 
G. THE HEALTH CARD  
 
PT Askes has the responsibility for producing and providing the health insurance card also 
known as the Askes-Gakin card. In the Askes system each member receives one card. This 
reduces the chance of misusing the card, however, the experience of the health care providers 
is that people sometimes bring the health insurance cards of other family members. The card 
is white and similar to the Askes card of the village officials.
15 No photograph is required for 
this card. The Askes-Gakin card contains information on the identity of the insured (name, 
membership number and sex), the office code (kode badan usaha), benefit package code, the 
code of treatment standard and the term of the card. 
 
PT Askes is the producer of the cards and it should take approximately seven days for the 
cards to reach the insured. According to PT Askes, Tabanan, the distribution process can 
take up to a maximum of one month and evidence gained through our interviews with 
puskesmas, pustu and village officials supports this conclusion. We also found that a number of 
cards were not ready yet. Even those cards that have been distributed sometimes cannot be 
immediately used. In Tua village, for example, some cards that had just arrived contained 
errors requiring correction. When the cards were ready, PT Askes gives them to the DinKes. 
The DinKes distributed the cards to each puskesmas. The village midwife took the cards from 
the puskesmas and gave them to the neighborhood heads (Kepala-Kepala Dusun) who know 
the recipients and are able to deliver the cards in their neighborhood. 
 
                                                 
15 The village officials (aparat desa) in Bali have been insured at the PT Askes since 1997. The premium is paid 
by the provincial government. SMERU Research Institute, September 2005  9




A. IDENTIFICATION AND VERIFICATION OF THE POOR (GAKIN) 
 
The DinKes Tabanan is very proud of the fact that in 2004 they carried out the identification 
of the poor independently. This data, which is called the “List of Members of Poor Families 
in Kabupaten Tabanan – For Health Services in the Year 2003” (Daftar Anggota Keluarga 
Miskin di Kabupaten Tabanan – Tahun 2003 untuk Pelayanan Kesehatan) is different to the data 
of BPS and Bappeda. According to the DinKes, unlike BPS’ and Bappeda’s data, their data on 
the poor is free from political influences. The identification only aimed to locate, count and 
list the gakin of Tabanan district. In other words, the survey was primarily aimed at 
identifying the poor for the health insurance membership. The data is compiled in the form 
of a thick red book that is also available at the PT Askes office in Tabanan and to each 
puskesmas in the district. The book functions as the main source of information on the 
identity of the poor (name, age, family relationship, residential address/village etc.). It seems 
useful also for the verification of the poor by providers. For the survey in 2003, there was no 
financial contribution from PT Askes. 
 
The identification of the poor who are eligible for health insurance was performed within a 
period of three months by DinKes staff, the village head, the dusun head and members of the 
puskesmas. After the initial year they realized that this process was not very effective and has 
a number of weaknesses. For next year the plan is to involve the health officials, the village 
midwife and volunteers from each village (kader). These people are closer to the people in 
society and have greater access to the information necessary to identify those in need of 
health support. 
 
A second step in the process is the verification of those identified as poor and also those 
people who have been identified as falling outside the category of poor. In Tabanan the 
puskesmas performs an auditing function to correct initial identification errors. The puskesmas 
can notify suspected cases of misidentification to the DinKes that can undertake a 
verification. If those who were not initially identified as gakin are really gakin, they will get 













                                                 
16 The verification and mutation of the data on gakin is planned to be carried out at the end of January 2005. SMERU Research Institute, September 2005  10
Based on the experiences of the puskesmas and staff associated with this function, it seems 
that the criteria used to identify the poor
17 are not very relevant or helpful in the field. These 
criteria were established by BKKBN on “Pra Keluarga Sejahtera”
18  (pre-prosperous family) 
and ‘Keluarga Sejahtera Tahap I’
19 (prosperous family at the first stage) and were used in the 
identification of the poor as the Tabanan district does not have a formal guideline such as a 
decree (surat keputusan/SK) on the criteria of the poor (gakin). 
 
The DinKes admitted that the absence of a guideline is one of the obstacles in identifying the 
poor since this means the identification is open to different interpretations and heavily 
dependent on direct observation. Dr. Era from Tabanan hospital also said that the 
identification of gakin in Tabanan is still problematic (“tidak tepat sasaran”). There are many 
known problems regarding those identified as poor and also those who remain unidentified. 
In several cases not all family members were registered for the health insurance card, in other 
instances personal information was wrongly administered. She suggested identifying gakin 
based on income, the number of dependent household members and local living standards. 
 
B. SOCIALIZATION OF THE HEALTH INSURANCE  
 
The socialization of the Askes-Gakin scheme is undertaken as a cooperative arrangement 
between DinKes, PT Askes and the village officials (especially the Kepala Dusun or Kelian 
Dinas).
20 Unlike the case of Purbalingga, the village midwife and kader play no role in the 
socialization of HI for the poor in Tabanan. In this district the socialization is mainly through 
the Kepala Dusun ( Kelian Dinas) who should explain the scheme to the poor in their 
neighborhood. In Tabanan, the socialization of the Askes–Gakin scheme appears to be rather 
minimal. In one case, a relatively new Kepala Dusun who received health insurance cards to 
be distributed to the people did not know what they were for. In addition, feedback from 
people in the neighborhoods indicates that there are many people, in fact the majority, who 




                                                 
17 The Prosperous Family indicators that represent the characteristics of a poor family are: 1. Unable to eat twice 
a day; 2. Unable to provide meat/fish/eggs as a side dish at least once per week; 3. Don’t possess a different set of 
clothes for each activity; 4. Unable to obtain at least one new set of clothing once per year 5. The largest part of 
the floor of the house is made of earth; 6. There is less than 8 square metres of floor space per occupant of the 
house; 7. There is no member of the family aged 15 years or over with a regular income; 8. Unable to access 
health facilities if a child is sick or to access family planning programs, and 9. Children aged between 7 and 15 
years are not in school. 
18 The definition of a Pre-prosperous family is “a family that cannot yet fulfill basic needs to a minimal standard, 
namely the need to practice their religion, food, clothing, shelter and health, or a family that cannot yet fulfill 
one or more of the indicators for a Level 1 Prosperous Family.” 
19 The definition of a Level 1 Prosperous Family is “a family that can fulfill basic needs to a minimal standard, 
but cannot yet fulfill their entire socio-psychological needs, namely education, family planning, family 
interactions, interactions with their residential environment and transport.” 
20 Every village in Bali is divided into one or more banjar, a traditional form of neighborhood association led by 
the head of a banjar (Kelian Banjar). The banjar’s primary function is to organize various religious ceremonies. 
The main responsibility of the Kelian Banjar is to lead the community and to maintain the well-being of all 
community members in their daily lives according to the traditional laws that govern that particular village. 
There are two types of Kelian Banjar, the Kelian Dinas, who is in charge of the administrative aspects of the 
banjar life, and the Kelian Adat, who looks after the customary aspects. SMERU Research Institute, September 2005  11
The DinKes also recognizes that the socialization did not have optimal results. The DinKes 
therefore plans to involve, among others, the Kelian Adat in the socialization of the Askes-
Gakin in its new term. The Kelian Adat is another category of prominent community member 
who knows more about local rules and customs (the awig-awig). It can be said that the Kelian 
Adat has more spiritual/charismatic authority while the Kelian Dinas has more political 
authority. The involvement of the Kelian Adat is expected to provide an alternative way to 
encourage people to enrol in health insurance or to cooperate in a program. One of the major 
factors contributing to successful socialization is good information distribution to those who 
will be in charge of the socialization program. If this is not properly addressed, the addition of 
a new element in the socialization process (in this case the involvement of the Kelian Adat) 




It is calculated that the cost of Askes–Gakin in Tabanan in 2004 is about Rp.2.2 billion 
(Rp.2,267,820,000)
21 per year. This consists of Rp453,492,000 (20%) for puskesmas capitation 
and Rp1,814,328,000 (80%) for the hospital claims. Although the allocations seem to be 
unbalanced and puskesmas (PPK I) receive a much smaller portion than the hospital (PPK II/III) 
we did not find any complaints from puskesmas that the JPK-Gakin subsidy is insufficient. 
 
The costs at the puskesmas are so much lower because the services provided at the puskesmas 
are first of all much cheaper than those provided at the hospital, but a second more important 
reason is that the puskesmas services are already highly subsidized. The puskesmas in Tabanan 
receives subsidies from central, provincial and district governments for the expenditures of 
the puskesmas. 
 
Looking at the financing of the puskesmas it becomes obvious that the funds from JPK-Gakin 
are more than enough to finance the health services of the poor. In fact, they have unspent 
monies that cannot be used for other than health service provision for the poor as they are 
tied funds. Sometimes the puskesmas have ideas on how to use the money to improve the 
quality of the puskesmas services. For example, the head of Puskesmas Tegal Ratu in Cilegon 
district told us that they badly needed to dig a better well since they regularly experienced 
lack of clean water. She even once had to close the puskesmas because they did not have 
clean water for a couple of days. She wanted to use the unspent portion of the subsidy to 
finance the well but it would be against the regulation. 
 
Puskesmas have different financial resources: 
1.  APBD II; 
2.  puskesmas income (For example: the patient contribution is Rp2,500/visit both in 
Puskesmas Penebel I and Puskemas Marga I); 
3.  capitation Askes-Gakin (Askes gives Rp1,000 x number of Gakin. From this amount, 
20% for the puskesmas head, 70% for the puskesmas staff and 10% for the puskesmas 
administration); and 




                                                 
21 Number of Gakin 37,791 times the premium Rp.5,000 for 12 months. SMERU Research Institute, September 2005  12
During the Tabanan fieldwork, SMERU researchers visited two puskesmas namely, Puskesmas 
Penebel I and Puskesmas Marga I. The head of both puskesmas complained about the 
decreasing income from the local government budget during the last couple of years. 
According to the head of Puskesmas Marga I, in 2002 – 2003 they received about Rp30 
million and in 2004 Rp21 million. The optimal operational costs of the puskesmas are Rp50 
million but the amount available is only between Rp10 – 20 million. 
 
On the other hand, the hospitals we visited have to struggle to cover the health costs. A few 
of them have a large deficit. The Tabanan hospital has a deficit of Rp.780 million. They have 
temporarily solved this problem by delaying payment for procurements (for instance on the 
purchase of medicines). According to BRSU, the deficit is also caused by the health costs of 
patients who are no longer identified as poor (and no longer entitled to the Askes-Gakin) but 
do not have the financial resources to pay the hospital bills. They referred to these kinds of 
patients as “pasien terlantar” or “pasien di luar system” (“patients outside the system”). BRSU 
Tabanan will not, and cannot, refuse patients even though they do have money to pay the 
services. As a result, the hospital has to cover the costs from their own financial resources. 
Regarding the total cost of JPK-Gakin scheme in Tabanan District (Rp2.2 billion), it was 
agreed that the central government would pay Rp1.3 billion (already provided) and the 
district government would cover the rest of the funds needed (Rp0.9 billion) but until now, 
the funds promised by the district government have not been provided. 
 
D. BENEFIT PACKAGE AND SERVICES 
 
The benefit package includes all services available from the primary care provider 
(puskesmas). In case additional or more specialized care is needed, a patient will be referred to 
the hospital where an insured is entitled to the third class treatment standard (standar 
pelayanan kelas III). In Tabanan, the DinKes and Askes have agreed that people who are 
willing and thus able to pay for a higher class of treatment are not poor and should not 
receive health insurance for the poor. An additional reason for this decision is that by 
making this regulation there should be a minimum quality standard for the puskesmas that the 
DinKes would like to uphold. Without regulations, real standards, and someone who bears the 
responsibility to accomplish this minimum quality standard, it is very difficult to achieve this. 
The agreement between DinKes Tabanan and PT Askes, Denpasar regulates the services that 
should be provided for Gakin members. These include: 
 
For outpatient treatment at the puskesmas level: 
a.  Promotive programs; 
b.  Preventive programs; 
c.  Curative programs (treatment and medication); and 
d.  Issuance of referral letter (for the hospital). 
 
For outpatient treatment at the hospital level: 
a.  Consultation, treatment and medication by specialized doctors; 
b.  Laboratory tests, radio and electromedic diagnoses; 
c.  Medical treatments (including the specialized ones); and 
d.  Medication (within the range of the official list of medicines and their prices or the DPHO).
22 
                                                 
22 DPHO (Daftar Plafon Harga Obat): A list of medications covered by health insurance providers and their 
ceiling prices. SMERU Research Institute, September 2005  13
For in-patient treatment at the hospital level: 
a.  in-patient facilities (the 3
rd class standard); 
b.  consultation, treatment and medication by specialized doctors; 
c.  laboratory tests, radio and electromedic diagnoses; 
d.  various sorts of medical treatments (including major surgery); 
e.  intensive care treatment (at the ICU); 
f.  medication (within the range of the official list of medicines and their prices or the 
DPHO); and 
g.  medical rehabilitation. 
 
E. UTILIZATION AND REFERRAL 
 
In Tabanan district, the utilization of Askes–Gakin is seen as still low: 
•  31.7% for outpatients at the PPK I/puskesmas
23 (while the national standard is 40%); 
•  2% for outpatients at the PPK II/hospital;
24 and 
•  0.3% for inpatients at the PPK II/hospital.
25 
 
According to two puskesmas that were visited during the fieldwork, they only refer special 
cases to the hospital (for example, the cases of high risk childbirth, cardio-vascular disease 
and serious injuries). Until now, no referrals have been refused by the hospital. Sometimes 
patients insist on being referred to the hospital although the puskesmas can treat the disease 
or, on the contrary, refuse to be referred although the puskesmas cannot treat the disease. The 
poor are often reluctant to be referred because they are afraid of the additional costs that are 
not covered by PT Askes. Moreover, for some patients, the transportation costs to reach the 
hospital are also too high. The patients who are referred to the hospital have to bring their 
Askes-Gakin card and the referral letter from the puskesmas together with one photocopy of 
each document. 
 
The head of Puskesmas Marga I complained about the Askes referral forms. According to 
him, the form is exactly the same as the referral form for the Askes non-Gakin patient and 
only available in limited numbers. Furthermore, in his opinion, PT Askes is too bureaucratic 
regarding the referral letter from the puskesmas. There have been emergency cases where the 
patients were brought directly to the RSUD (such as accidents). It should not be necessary to 
“formally” refer such patients from a puskesmas as it is very obvious that a puskesmas cannot 
treat such serious illnesses/injuries. In practice, the hospital still asked for the referral letter 
from the puskesmas so that the patient’s relatives had to return to the puskesmas for the sole 
purpose of obtaining that letter. In his view, this is unnecessary and inefficient. When a 
response was sought from the DinKes Tabanan on this problem, they agreed that emergency 
cases indeed do not need to be referred by puskesmas. Chronic cases only need to be referred 
once in six months. The DinKes seems to be aware of the problem and have communicated 
their concerns to several staff members and doctors of the hospital. They worry however, that 
the hospital staff do not communicate the complaints with each other. The hospital staff – 
                                                 
23 The utilization rate of health services: % = the number of visits at a given health center/total number of gakin 
in Tabanan x 100. According to an evaluation of the JPK-Gakin scheme in 2004 by DinKes Tabanan, the 
utilization rate at puskesmas is 11,980/37,791x100= 31.7. 
24 The number of Gakin outpatient visits to the Tabanan hospital is 756. 
25 The number of Gakin in-patient visits to the Tabanan hospital is 113. SMERU Research Institute, September 2005  14
especially those who are at the front desk and in charge of checking the formalities – tend to 
be more rigid as they seek to avoid administration mistakes. 
 
Medicine for the poor 
 
All health care providers (PPK I and II) mentioned that the medicines that are meant for the 
poor differ from the medicines for the non-poor. Puskesmas do not have to apply for 
medicines for the Askes-Gakin patients. The medicines are provided to puskesmas as one 
package from the DinKes. The sorts and amount of medicines received by a puskesmas are 
decided by the DinKes and is (theoretically) based on the specific need of each puskesmas (the 
main health problems of the poor in the given puskesmas). In Puskesmas Penebel I, for 
instance, the medicines for Askes-Gakin were provided in May-June 2004. The health care 
providers also have to report the usage of these medicines separately from the medicines used 
by the non-Gakin. The medicines that are available for the poor are even more limited than 
the “normal” spectrum of medicines available at the puskesmas. This can have serious 
consequences and is a major limit on the quality of care that the poor can receive. 
 
Monitoring Mechanisms and Coordination among the Stakeholders 
 
Monitoring mechanisms between DinKes and the different health care providers exist but are 
limited to monthly financial expenditure and utilization of health care services reports. The 
PPK I/puskesmas is obliged to provide monthly (financial) reports to the DinKes, but on the 
other hand the PPK II/RSUD does not have this obligation and can provide its financial 
report directly to PT Askes. This different monitoring system undermines the function of 
DinKes as “the supervisor and coordinator” of the health insurance system for the poor. For 
the DinKes it is very difficult to get the information regarding health care services at the 
hospital after the initiation of the Askes-Gakin. According to the DinKes, this is a “political 
matter” (although they did not explain exactly what this means) and because the BRSU 
considers itself at the same level with the DinKes. 
 
The report of the hospital to PT Askes includes: 
1.  the number of in-patients (Rawat Inap); 
2.  the number of outpatients (Rawat Jalan); 
3.  the costs of special treatment (Tindakan Khusus); and 
4.  the total expenditures. 
 
It can be said that the existing monitoring mechanisms are only financial monitoring ones. 
As is the case with other studies (Cilegon and Purbalingga), the DinKes of Tabanan also 
referred to a “Community Complaints Unit”’ (“Unit Pengaduan Masyarakat”) whose role is to 
record complaints on the health services. In Tabanan, this UPM, which is located at the 
DinKes, supposedly consists of five people from DinKes and the local government. 
Nevertheless, this cannot be seen as a sufficient mechanism to control the quality of services 
because the UPM does not have a clear policy and authority. 
 
According to PT Askes, there is coordination among DinKes, PT Askes and the providers of 
health services. Each “case” (of complaint) would be handled separately by this coordinating 
team but they do not meet regularly. Furthermore, PT Askes also has a 24-hour “hotline 
service” for complaints and enquiries. This kind of vague monitoring mechanism and 
coordination are similar to other cases (Purbalingga and Cilegon). SMERU Research Institute, September 2005  15
DinKes Tabanan also admitted that they still need to develop a more effective control 
mechanism for the Askes–Gakin scheme. Until now DinKes, as the supervisor of the scheme, 
only received reports (e.g. on implementation problems) from the health providers and PT 
Askes. In the near future, DinKes plans to carry out a study on the implementation of Askes-
Gakin, but they are not sure whether they have enough staff to carry out this task. 
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IV. EXPERIENCES FROM DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES 
 
 
A. THE PUSKESMAS 
 
In general, the heads of both puskemas (as well as the puskesmas visited by the research team 
in Cilegon and Purbalingga districts) mentioned that from the puskesmas’ point of view, the 
JPK-Gakin system is better than the previous health financing mechanism. There are two 
main arguments for this observation. First of all, the new system relieves the puskesmas of the 
burden of being responsible for the identification of the poor and issuance of the gakin card. 
In the health card system, the head of the puskesmas had to sign the cards and was therefore 
seen as the main person in the selection of gakin. People complained or were even angry with 
the puskesmas staff if they were not assessed as eligible to receive free health services. In the 
new system if there are protests from those who are not entitled to the card, the puskesmas 
head can suggest to them that they look for information at the DinKes or PT Askes office (or 
the Bapel, in other districts). Secondly, the Bapel is responsible for the administration that 
comes with the processing of the members eligible for health insurance. This saves the 
puskesmas from a large burden of administrative work. This investigation also found that the 
puskesmas are content with the current system because, in general, the capitation is more 
than enough for the puskesmas to cover the health cost of the poor and thus no additional 




Puskesmas Penebel I is located at Pitra village, Kecamatan Penebel, which has 27,572 
inhabitants. This puskesmas has two doctors, one dentist, 12 midwives (bidan) and seven 
pustu. The Penebel I serves inhabitants of nine surrounding villages. There are 4,307 people 
eligible for the Askes-Gakin health insurance scheme, this makes up 15.6 % of Tabanan’s 
population. According to the midwife at Pustu Senganan, which belongs to Puskesmas 
Penebel I, all gakin in her pustu have received the Askes-Gakin card. Nevertheless, Penebel I 
also provides services to patients who have other types of health insurance (Askes scheme). 
Table 1. The Number of Insured Patients in Penebel I 
Type of Askes scheme  Number of insured 
Askes wajib  2,824 
Askes sukarela – umum  41 
Askes wajib – Sulinggih  4 
Askes-Gakin 4,307 
Total insured patients in Penebel I  7,176 
(About 26% of the total population in the sub-
district/Kecamatan Penebel) SMERU Research Institute, September 2005  17
The JPK-Gakin capitation is based on the number of poor in the region served by the 
puskesmas and will be allocated according to the decree issued by the head of DinKes 
Tabanan.
26 Based on the decree, the distribution of the Rp51.7 million allocation is: 
Table 2. Allocation of Total Capitation for Puskesmas Penebel I (Rp.) 
30% for the kabupaten (district)  15.6 million 
A 
70% for the puskesmas  36.1 million 
B 
Total capitation  51.7 million 
Table 3. Allocation of the District Portion (A) in Rupiah 
Management fee  5%  2.6 million 
Supervision of JPK-Gakin Tabanan District  5%  2.6 million 
Coordination Team at the district level (TKK)  5%  2.6 million 
Operational cost of JPK-Gakin scheme at the 
DinKes 
15% 7.8  million 
Total 30%  15.6  million 
Table 4. Allocation of the Puskesmas Portion (B) in Rupiah 
Fee for the head of puskesmas  14%   7.2  million 
Reserve for operational cost of JPK-Gakin 
scheme at the puskemas 
7%   3.6  million 
Fee of other puskesmas staffs  49% 25.3  million 
Total 70%  36.1  million 
As the tables show, most of the capitation is allocated for costs related to the functions of 
different stakeholders (fee for management, supervision, coordination, provision of health 
care). From the interviews, it seems that some of these functions – such as supervision and 
coordination – are quite unclear. If the fees are considered as an incentive for stakeholders to 
improve their performance and services, the effectiveness of this incentive is questionable. 
In 2004, the poor visited the puskesmas approximately 1,656 times.
27 Based on this, we can 
calculate that the health care cost of Penebel I for the gakin patients would be Rp4,140,000.
28 
As Penebel I is entitled to a Rp51.7 million
29 subsidy per year, the health care cost in 2004 
was only 8.0% of the subsidy. 
Apart from the capitation of Askes-Gakin, Penebel I receives income from other sources 
namely: reimbursement from other Askes schemes, the operational and regular funds from 
APBD and income from patient contributions (Rp2,500/visit). The puskesmas head 
complained that the income from other sources has declined, therefore the capitation of 
Askes-Gakin is very helpful in preventing a more disadvantageous financial condition. 
                                                 
26 The Decree number: 050/1457/DIKES/2004 issued by the Head of the Dinas Kesehatan, Kabupaten Tabanan 
concerning the determination of allocations and utilization of guaranteed capitation funds for the health care of 
poor families (JPK-Gakin). 
27 Based on data, the number of Gakin visits to Puskesmas Penebel I from January – October 2004 is 1,380. From 
that number we can extrapolate that in 2004 approximately 1,656 visits to the puskesmas were made. 
28  1,656 x puskesmas patient contributions Rp.2,500. 
29  4,307 Gakin x Rp.1,000 x 12 months. SMERU Research Institute, September 2005  18
From the data on new visits at the Puskesmas Penebel I in 2003 and 2004, it can be 
concluded that the utilization of puskesmas services (not including pustu and polindes) by the 
non-gakin patients is higher than the gakin patients. According to the puskesmas head, the 
barrier for many gakin to get the free health services they are entitled to is the transportation 
cost to reach the puskesmas. This is especially the case for those who live relatively far from 
the health center. The puskesmas pembantu (pustu), which is located in almost each village, is 
therefore more accessible for the gakin patients. In 2004 the utilization of puskesmas services 
by the gakin was slightly lower than in 2003. 
Table 5. Utilization in Penebel I, 2003 (Only Visits at the Puskesmas) 
Month  Gakin  Non Gakin  Total  % Gakin 
January 53  351  404  13.3 
February 34  296  330  10.3 
March 24  312  336  7.1 
April 3  291  326  10.7 
May 23  228  251  9.2 
June 35  164  199  17.6 
July 30  213  243  12.3 
August 29  170  199  14.6 
September 30  193  223  13.5 
October 38  188  226  16.8 
November 47  154  201  23.4 
December 21  240  261  8.0 
      
Total one year  399  2,800  3,199  12.5 
Table 6. Utilization Penebel I, 2004 (Only Visits at the Puskesmas) 
Month  Gakin  Non-Gakin  Total  % Gakin 
January 19  193  212  9.0 
February 19  186  205  9.3 
March 32  249  281  11.4 
April 26  302  328  7.9 
May 32  197  229  14.0 
June 35  231  266  13.2 
July 33  212  245  13.5 
August 36  195  231  15.6 
September 36  196  232  15.5 
October 32  240  272  11.8 
November 32  199  231  13.9 
December 36  325  361  10.0 
      
Total one year  368  2,725  3,093  11.9 
The puskesmas head said that the hospital never rejected the referral from Penebel I. The 
puskesmas only sent patients to the hospital if they cannot be treated in the puskesmas, for 
example in cases of childbirth with complications and cardio-vascular diseases. In 2004 
Penebel I referred fewer patients to the Tabanan hospital than in 2003. Furthermore, the 
number of Gakin patients referred both in 2003 as well as in 2004 was much lower than for 
the non-Gakin patients. 
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Table 7. Number of Referrals from Puskesmas Penebel I to Tabanan Hospital 
Type of patients  2003  2004 
Gakin   165 (29%)    53 (10%) 
Non-Gakin  406 (71%)  460 (90%) 
Total 571      510 
 
Marga I 
Puskesmas Marga I is located in Kuwum village, Kecamatan Marga which had 22,544 
inhabitants in 2003 and 22,569 in 2004. This puskesmas has six pustu. The Marga I serves 
inhabitants of six surrounding villages. The number of gakin, who are entitled to free health 
services in this puskesmas, is 3,308; all of them are insured by the JPK-Gakin Scheme. Like 
Penebel I, Puskesmas Marga I also provides services to patients who have other types of 
health insurance (Askes scheme). 
Table 8. The Number of Insured Patients in Marga I 
Type of Askes scheme  Number of insured 
Askes wajib -   3,145 
Askes sukarela – umum  43 
Askes wajib – Sulinggih  5 
Askes-Gakin 3,308 
Total insured patients in Penebel I  6,501 
(About 29 % of the total population in 
the sub-district/Kecamatan Marga) 
Utilization at the Marga I in 2004 was 1,482.
30 Based on this, we can calculate that the health 
care cost of Marga I was Rp3,705,000.
31 As Marga I is entitled to Rp39,696,000
32 million 
subsidy per year, the health care cost in 2003 was only 9.3 % of the subsidy. Furthermore, the 
JPK-Gakin capitation, to which each puskesmas is entitled, will be allocated according to the 
decree issued by the head of DinKes Tabanan. Based on the decree, the distribution of the 
allocation of Rp39.7 million is: 
Table 9. Allocation of Total Capitation for Puskesmas Marga I (Rp.) 
30% for the kabupaten (district)  12 million 
A 
70% for the puskesmas  27.9 million 
B 
Total capitation  39.9 million 
Table 10. Allocation of the District Portion (A) in Rupiah 
Management fee  5%  2 million 
Supervision of JPK-Gakin Tabanan District  5%  2 million 
Coordination Team at the district level (TKK)  5%  2 million 
Operational cost of JPK-Gakin scheme at the 
DinKes 
15% 6  million 
                                                 
30  Utilization between January – October 2004 is 1,235. 
31 1,482 x puskesmas patient contributions Rp.2,500. 
32 3,308 Gakin x Rp.1,000 x 12 months. SMERU Research Institute, September 2005  20
Total 30%  12  million 
Table 11. Allocation of the Puskesmas Portion(B) in Rupiah 
Fee for the head of puskesmas  14% 5.6  million 
Reserve for operational cost of 
JPK-Gakin scheme at the puskemas 
7% 2.8  million 
Fee of other puskesmas staff  49% 19.5  million 
Total 70%  27.9  million 
Marga I receives income from similar sources to Penebel I, namely: Askes-Gakin capitation, 
reimbursement of other Askes schemes, the operational and regular funds from APBD and income from 
patient contributions (Rp.2,500/visit). The head of Marga I also complained about the reduction in 
puskesmas income, especially the operational and regular funds from the DinKes Tabanan. 
From the data on new visits at the Puskesmas Marga I and the pustu in 2003 and 2004, this 
investigation also found a similar trend to Penebel I; namely the utilization of puskesmas services by 
the non-Gakin patients is much higher than the Gakin patients. Nevertheless, because the visits at 
the pustu were also included, the utilization of gakin patients is obviously higher than in Penebel I. 
As was mentioned above, those who live far from the puskesmas usually prefer to go to the pustu 
that is located in almost every village. Unlike the case with Puskesmas Penebel I, the utilization of 
puskesmas services by the gakin in Puskesmas Marga I was slightly higher in 2004 than in 2003. 
Table 12. Utilization in Marga I, 2003 (Visits at the Puskemas and Pustu) 
Month  Gakin  Non-Gakin  Total  % Gakin 
January 182  613  795  22.9 
February 136  331  467  29.9 
March 154  535  689  22.4 
April 86  379  465  18.5 
May 96  419  515  18.6 
June 151  492  642  23.5 
July 123  387  510  24.1 
August 99  428  527  18.8 
September 146  566  712  20.5 
October 71  351  422  16.8 
November 90  372  462  19.5 
December 87  292  379  23.0 
Total  one  year  1,421 5,165 6,586  21.6 
Table 13. Utilization in Marga I, 2004 (Visits at the Puskesmas and Pustu) 
Month  Gakin  Non-Gakin  Total  % Gakin 
January  143 596 739 19.4 
February  157 557 714 22.0 
March  112 437 549 20.4 
April  174 584 758 22.9 
May  107 480 587 18.2 
June  149 367 516 28.9 
July 98  299  397  24.7 
August  113 335 448 25.2 
September 91  333  424  21.5 
October  129 481 610 21.1 
November 60  303  370  16.2 SMERU Research Institute, September 2005  21
December  208 259 467 44.5 
Total  one  year  1548 5031 6579 23.5 
Also in Marga I, only selected cases were referred to Tabanan hospital. These included major 
injuries, childbirth with complications and health problems that need more specialized 
treatments (mostly ophthalmological problems). As is the case with Puskesmas Penebel I, the 
referral rate for Gakin patients is much lower than for non-Gakin patients. 
Table 14. Number of Referrals from Puskesmas Marga I to Tabanan Hospital 
Type of patients  2004 
Gakin     18 (4%) 
Non-Gakin  449 (96%) 
Total 467 
According to the head of Puskesmas Marga I, the reason for the low referral rate is mostly 
because Gakin patients are afraid that they will probably have to pay additional costs for 
treatment at the hospital. He also said that it is unfair for the poor patients who are not 
utilizing their rights only because they are not well informed by PT Askes about the 
treatments and medicines they are entitled to. When we asked him what information the 
puskesmas provided the Gakin patients about their rights, he admitted that he also did not 
know what exactly was included in the benefit package of PT Askes. 
Information on the benefit package (the services the poor are entitled to receive at the 
puskesmas and hospitals), treatments that are not covered by PT Askes and the procedure to 
get the health services is actually in the formal agreement between PT Askes and DinKes 
Tabanan.
33 PT Askes also has booklets – available at the Denpasar office - and from their 
website that provide information on their products. These are, however, not an accessible 
medium of communication for the Gakin clients. 
B. THE HOSPITAL 
Badan Rumah Sakit Umum (BRSU) “Rumah Kita” Tabanan 
The BRSU “Rumah Kita” Tabanan is a public hospital and the only hospital in the district. 
This hospital has a total of 578 staff; including 52 doctors (24 specialized doctors). The 
hospital manages its own financial resources and only receives a limited subsidy from the 
APBD. This subsidy is allocated for the salary of hospital staff who are civil servants (287 
people or almost 50% of the staff). The hospital building is a facility also provided by the 
local government. The purchase of medicines and medical instruments and the salaries of 
non-civil servant staff are independently financed. According to the management, most of 
the hospital tariffs are still provided at below their real cost and therefore they still struggle 
with a deficit.
34 The hospital is also able to borrow money from individuals in case of 
                                                 
33 Cooperative Agreement between the Government of Kabupaten  Tabanan and PT (Persero) Asuransi 
Kesehatan Indonesia, Denpasar Branch, concerning the Implementation of Health Care Support (“Perjanjian 
Kerja sama antara Pemerintah Kabupaten Tabanan dengan PT (Persero) Asuransi Kesehatan Indonesia Cabang 
Denpasar tentang Penyelenggaraan Jaminan Pemeliharaan Kesehatan”). Effective from 1 April 2004 to 31 
March 2005. Code BU: 2202 8407. 
34 According to the hospital management, only the VIP class operates on a full cost-recovery basis, which allows 
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necessity but have not been able to identify the individuals in order to obtain a better idea of 
the incentive structure behind this lending process. 
About Rp1.8 billion (80%) of the JPK-Gakin funds in 2004 were allocated for the health 
care expenditures made by the hospital. This is one of the income sources of the hospital, but 
the amount is a relatively small share (8.3%) in comparison to the total income of the 
hospital from other sources. The hospital receives reimbursements of Askes–Gakin claims 
monthly. 
Table 15. The Total Income of Tabanan Hospital 2001 – 2004, 
not including JPK-Gakin Funds (in millions of Rp.) 
Year  Income 




Source: BRSU Kabupaten Tabanan, “Hospital Performance Data from 2001 to 2004”. 
One disadvantage of a capitation system is that there is a possibility of a diminished quality of 
service as the provider is limited in its income. With a fee-for-service (FFS) system such an 
impact is not expected to occur, but an increase in the quality of services is not expected to 
occur with a FFS either. By implementing a financing scheme for the poor one does expect a 
decrease in pressure on the service provider to contain costs and thus, in comparison to a 
system where poor patients pay for services, this may avoid a decrease in quality. As to the 
effect of the financing scheme, the management of BRSU Tabanan argued that the previous 
health financing mechanism (Subsidi BBM – 2001) is better than the Askes–Gakin scheme 
(2004). The previous mechanism totally covered the health costs while the Askes-Gakin 
scheme only covered services that are on the Askes list. This caused dissatisfaction among 
the insured. 
Between January – October 2004, the visit rate – both outpatients as well as in-patients - of 
the Gakin patients in Tabanan hospital is much lower than the non-Gakin patients. This is 
consistent with the very small number of Gakin patients referred by puskesmas. 
Table 16. The Number of Outpatient and In-patient Visits at Tabanan Hospital  
(Jan – Oct 2004) 
Sort of visit  Gakin  Non-Gakin  Total  % Gakin 
Outpatient 763  45,153  45,916  1.7 
In-patient 359  7,643  8,002  4.5 
Source: BRSU Tabanan, “Hospital Performance Data from 2001 to 2004” and “Results of the Evaluation of 
Health Care Support for Poor Families (JPK-Gakin) in Kabupaten Tabanan for the year 2004.”SMERU Research Institute, September 2005  23
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 
A. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STAKEHOLDERS 
 
The major involvement of PT Askes in the management of health financing for the poor in 
Indonesia has been legalized since January 1
st, 2005. Whilst many other districts are still in 
the early phases of a transition period from the Bapel system to the Askes system, Tabanan 
district has fully implemented a cooperative agreement with PT Askes. It was mentioned in 
the previous section that this choice is based on two reasons; namely, the district wanted to 
avoid mismanagement by an inexperienced insurer and PT Askes is considered to be a 
professional insurance company with extended experience (more than three decades) and a 
wide working area. In other districts like Purbalingga and East Sumba, the local government 
and the DinKes have developed a management unit (the Badan Pengelola or Bapel) as the 
insurer. This management unit has a closer relationship with the DinKes in many respects 
because it is run by staff of DinKes or the district public hospital. Moreover, the office of 
Bapel is often located at the DinKes office (for instance in Cilegon and in East Sumba). 
Consequently, in this system, DinKes - as the key supervisor of the JPK-Gakin scheme - has a 
stronger grip on the insurer. 
 
In the light of this, the choice to collaborate with an experienced private company like PT 
Askes has some consequences. The supervision and monitoring by DinKes of an insurer like 
PT Askes runs the risk of being less effective because PT Askes is a relatively well-established 
institution that is totally independent of the DinKes. Moreover, there is a difference in the 
level of expertise and experience between PT Askes and the DinKes regarding the 
management of insurance schemes. Therefore the supervision and monitoring by DinKes of 
PT Askes tends to be “formal” instead of “actual”. This difference in the level of expertise 
and experience can also be a barrier for the DinKes to negotiate the cost and coverage of the 
scheme with PT Askes. For example, the DinKes Tabanan admitted that they have been 
unsuccessful in bargaining a lower premium with PT Askes. For the new contract they also 
intend to negotiate a better benefit package to be provided by PT Askes. 
 
PT Askes – as the insurer – is also barely involved in the promotion and socialization of the 
JPK-Gakin program in Tabanan. They also did not engage in the identification of the gakin – 
thus, their potential clients - and only use the data compiled by DinKes Tabanan. In other 
words, in Tabanan, the insurer did not participate in the marketing of the scheme or in 
providing good information to the potential clients. In Purbalingga district, the Bapel (as the 
insurer) worked closely with DinKes,  puskesmas, the village midwives and volunteers to 
identify and recruit clients. The Bapel allocated special funds and assigned staff to promote 
the scheme. Using DinKes’ extensive network (especially the puskesmas, village midwives and 
volunteers) the Bapel in Purbalingga reached their clients down to the neighbourhood level. 
As a result, it appears that clients in Purbalingga are better informed and have a closer 
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B. THE EFFECTS ON THE PROVISION OF HEALTH CARE SERVICES 
 
The poor (as the clients) of the JPK-Gakin scheme – both in Bapel as well as the Askes 
system - have the strongest interest in the provision of good quality health care services. 
They cannot, however, utilize their purchasing power to affect the quality of services as the 
scheme is fully funded by the central and local government. In this paradigm, the DinKes is 
responsible for articulating and protecting the interest of the poor. With regard to the 
barriers mentioned before however, DinKes is not the most effective institution to carry out 
these tasks. 
 
The capitation for the primary health care provider (the puskesmas) can be a suitable system 
to contain cost although in this system there is the possibility that the quality of services will 
be reduced in the pursuit of lower costs. Nevertheless, containing costs is an important issue 
for puskesmas as the capitation they received is more than adequate. The question will be 
whether adequate capitation fees will stimulate a better service. Obviously, the JPK-Gakin 
scheme can secure primary health care for the poor, but this does not necessarily mean that 
the poor will receive good quality of care. In general, the health care at the puskesmas is quite 
limited both in terms of quality and variety. The implementation of the JPK-Gakin scheme – 
including  adequate capitation for puskesmas from this scheme - would certainly not change 
this condition easily as the condition relates to more complex factors such as the availability 
of good medical staff, instruments and facilities. Regarding the fact that the capitation is 
quite strictly allocated for certain costs (e.g. various fees for the stakeholders) so that the 
puskesmas cannot easily use the unspent funds for other purposes (e.g. to improve clean water 
system, the building etc.), it can be said that adequate capitation fees do not really empower 
puskesmas to solve the problems they have. The fee-for-service system for the secondary and 
tertiary health care providers does not provide the motivation to contain the costs either. 
Furthermore, it does not necessarily increase the quality of services. 
 
The most positive effect of the JPK-Gakin scheme on the provision of health care for the 
poor is the possibility to get secondary and tertiary health care that is usually unaffordable for 
the poor. Nevertheless, for a range of different reasons, the majority of Gakin patients are not 
referred to the hospital. There are cases where the Gakin patients refused to be referred to the 
hospital although it was necessary because they were insecure about the additional costs that 
were not covered by PT Askes. They were also not well informed about the benefit package. 
At this point we can conclude that although the JPK-Gakin scheme does secure the right of 
the poor to get medical treatment at the hospital, it cannot secure the actualization of it. To 
push the actualization, the poor should at least be better informed about what treatments 
they are entitled to so that they do not forego the required treatment only because they are 
insecure about the financial consequences. Most importantly, the benefit package needs to be 
improved in order to reduce the co-payment required by the Gakin patients. 
 